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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE SURVIVORS: STRENGTHENING THE DISPARATE
IMPACT THEORY
DENISE R. J. FINLAY

ABSTRACT
Domestic violence is a growing problem in the United States, and the
issues survivors face do not end at home. This Article argues that the
disparate impact theory, used in interpreting sex discrimination under Title
VII, can and should be used to provide protections for survivors of domestic
violence in the workplace. In order to achieve this improvement and
increase the use of the disparate impact theory, a clear interpretation must
be made. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) could
provide guidance, or the disparate impact theory could be added to the Code
of Federal Regulations interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII. This
Article begins by providing a background for how domestic violence affects
a survivor’s work experience as well as a background of sex discrimination
theories under Title VII in Parts II and III respectively. Part IV addresses
how to use the disparate impact theory to protect working domestic
violence survivors, and Part V introduces my proposal to change Title VII’s
interpretation. Part VI applies Title VII to women employees who are also
survivors by outlining limitations of Title VII and offering a comparison to
discrimination under the Fair Housing Act. Finally, Part VII outlines how
the changes I have suggested may be implemented to improve use of
disparate impact theory to protect survivors.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

One in three women experience physical violence by an intimate
partner, and nearly one in ten women are raped by an intimate partner in her
lifetime.1 Domestic violence and sexual assault significantly affect women
in the United States.2 In 2012, in North Dakota, 4,624 new victims received
services from crisis centers across the state, and ninety-four percent of these
victims were women.3 Domestic violence is “a pattern of behavior in which
one intimate partner uses physical violence and/or sexual or economic
abuse to control the other partner in the relationship.”4 Domestic violence
1. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, NATIONAL INTIMATE PARTNER AND
SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY, 39 (2010) [hereinafter CDC SURVEY]. It is recognized that men are
also survivors of domestic violence, but this Article will focus on women due to the
disproportionate number of women who are victimized. See id.
2. The same survey reported that about one in ten men in the United States have experienced
rape, physical violence, and/or stalking by an intimate partner. Id.
3. Facts About Domestic Violence in North Dakota, N.D. COUNCIL ON ABUSED WOMEN’S
SERVS.,
http://www ndcaws.org/facts/domestic_violence/domestic_violence_stats html
(last
visited April 25, 2013) (finding at least seventy-five percent of victims served were physically
abused and weapons were used in at least eleven percent of the cases identified).
4. JULIE GOLDSCHIED & ROBIN RUNGE, AM. BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 2 (2009).
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is not solely defined by physical abuse, but also by patterns of behavior that
could include threats, intimidation, and other controlling acts.5
Domestic violence exists in the workplace and can take many forms.
Approximately, two-thirds of employed survivors6 reported her abuser
harassed her at work,7 and up to half of those women also reported she lost
a job due at least in part due to domestic violence.8 Over half of employed
survivors also reported they missed work because of the abuse, and fortyseven percent stated they were directly prevented from going to work by
their abuser.9 Maintaining employment is crucial to a survivor of domestic
violence. If she is trying to escape the violence, she will need income to
afford relocation. She may also need regular income to pay for medical
expenses. She may need to go to court to testify against her abuser who has
been charged, or to obtain a protection order for her safety. Some women
may be fired simply because the employer learns she is a survivor of
domestic violence and fears “the potential drama” that domestic violence
may bring to the workplace.10 This example would constitute employment
discrimination under Title VII.11 The disparate impact theory is an
employment discrimination doctrine used for members of a protected class
to assert a claim of discrimination, based on a facially neutral policy that
adversely affects the class as a whole.12 This Article will examine how the
disparate impact theory in sex discrimination should be used to protect
domestic violence survivors from discrimination in the workplace.

5. Id.
6. The author uses the term “survivor” to describe women who have experienced or are
currently experiencing domestic violence as opposed to “victim.” While working as a crisis-line
advocate in North Dakota, the author learned in her training that “survivor” is a term preferred by
most women who have experienced violence or are enduring violence in their lives, as well as the
advocates, counselors, and volunteers who work with them. The term “victim” is only used in this
paper where it is taken directly from another cited article or statutory text.
7. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 3-4.
8. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR EMPLOYMENT AMONG WELFARE RECIPIENTS 7-9 (1998), available at http://www.gao.
gov/archive/1999/he99012.pdf.
9. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 4 (citing Judith McFarlane et al., Indicators of
Intimate Partner Violence in Women’s Employment, 48 AM. ASSOC. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH
NURSES J. 217 (2000)).
10. Questions and Answers: The Application of Title VII and the ADA to Applicants or
Employees Who Experience Domestic Violence, Sexual Assault or Stalking, EEOC,
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/qa_domestic_violence.cfm (last visited Apr. 13, 2013).
11. Id.
12. See infra note 73.
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II. TITLE VII: PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act was enacted in 1964 and amended in
1991 to prohibit discrimination in employment against protected classes:
race, national origin, color, sex, and religion.13
Because of the
disproportionate number of women who are survivors of domestic violence,
discrimination against a survivor of domestic violence in the workplace
constitutes sex discrimination under Title VII.14 Terminating a woman
because she is a victim of domestic violence is, in essence, terminating her
because of her sex.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created the EEOC, which is
charged with enforcing federal employment discrimination laws. The
congressional purpose of Title VII is to provide equal employment
opportunities.15 Considering the impact that domestic violence has on
women’s lives, specifically in the workplace, preventing discrimination
against survivors of domestic violence seems to support the Congressional
goals of Title VII.16 Why is it that this goal has not been met and survivors
of domestic violence are not being protected from discrimination in the
workplace? The answer is arguably because the disparate impact theory,
the most applicable legal theory to employment discrimination against
domestic violence survivors, is not thoroughly developed in case law or
supporting federal regulations. Fifty-two percent of women survivors are
terminated for reasons attributable in some way to domestic abuse. 17 The
larger pattern of inferior treatment and sex discrimination is obvious.
Congress clearly intended to protect survivors of domestic violence under
Title VII, even if it is not facially apparent in the statute.18
In 1979, Congress adopted federal regulations interpreting Title VII,
which were to provide guidance regarding the implementation of Title VII
and are found in the Code of Federal Regulations (“the regulations”).19

13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
14. See id.; Julie Goldschied, Domestic Violence as a Form of Discrimination, in THE
IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 389, 391 (2d ed. 2004).
15. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a) (2012).
16. Id. § 1608.1(b).
17. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 19.
18. This intent was recently made more apparent in October 2012, when the EEOC published
a fact sheet on their website outlining how Title VII applies to employees who have experienced
domestic violence or dating violence, sexual assault, or stalking, complete with examples. EEOC,
supra note 10.
19. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a).
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These regulations are subject to amendment through proposed rules. 20 The
EEOC21 also uses guidelines to interpret theories of workplace
discrimination.22 Courts, lawyers, and administrative agencies use the
guidelines in order to locate appropriate legal doctrines, and the regulations
clarify the application of law to fact as well. Federal regulations are
regularly cited by courts but are persuasive authority and not binding.23
Many causes of action under Title VII are described by these regulations
and guidelines, and these may be used to protect survivors of domestic
violence in the workplace.24 Unfortunately, sexual harassment is the only
form of sex discrimination described by the regulations used to interpret
Title VII. Additionally, the disparate impact theory is not mentioned. In
order for Title VII to effectively protect domestic violence survivors from
discrimination in the workplace, regulations and guidelines interpreting the
disparate impact theory should be added.
The subsections that follow will outline sexual harassment, disparate
treatment, and disparate impact analyses and explain whether they apply to
the scenarios described in Part III: when the abuser and survivor work
together, when the abuser is harassing the survivor at her workplace (in
person or through other means), or when the abuse has an indirect impact
on the survivor’s workplace.
A. SEXUAL HARASSMENT
In restricted circumstances, a domestic violence survivor may seek
recourse through a claim of sexual harassment.25 This limited theory
provides an opportunity for women who are attacked by third parties.26 In

20. See, e.g., Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76
Fed. Reg. 70, 921 (proposed Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
21. The EEOC is the federal agency charged with enforcement of Title VII; see 29 C.F.R.
§1608.1.
22. 29 C.F.R. § 1608.1(a).
23. See, e.g., Local No. 93, Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, AFL-CIO C.L.C. v. City of Cleveland,
478 U.S. 501, 515 (1986).
24. See Maria Amelia Calaf, Breaking the Cycle: Title VII, Domestic Violence, and
Workplace Discrimination, 21 LAW & INEQ. 167, 177-90 (2003) (describing theories of sex
discrimination).
25. EEOC, supra note 10.
26. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the United States Supreme Court first recognized
sexual harassment as a prohibited form of sex discrimination in the workplace. 106 S. Ct. 2399,
2411 (1996). In this case, Ms. Vinson brought action against her supervisor and the bank that she
worked for, claiming that sexual advances by her supervisor created a hostile work environment.
Id. at 2402. Sexual harassment claims are divided into two types: quid pro quo harassment and
hostile work environment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2012). The details of these theories are
complicated and beyond the scope of this article. See Calaf, supra note 24, at 177; see also
Kristen L. Mix, A Sexual Harassment Primer, 29 COLO. LAW 33, 34 (Oct. 2000). See generally B.
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some instances, this third party could be the woman’s intimate partner who
is also a co-worker or supervisor. In other cases, sexual harassment could
occur where an employee’s supervisor learns she has recently been subject
to abuse, sees her as vulnerable, and when he makes sexual advances, she
refuses and he terminates her employment.27
The North Dakota Human Rights Act (ND Human Rights Act)
prohibits sex discrimination, among other protected classes.28 In North
Dakota, a survivor of domestic violence who meets jurisdictional
requirements would file her action for sex discrimination against her
employer with the North Dakota Department of Labor, Human Rights
Division.29 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated, when interpreting
the ND Human Rights Act, they will look to federal interpretations of Title
VII for guidance.30 This court also concluded that sexual harassment is an
actionable form of sex discrimination under the ND Human Rights Act. 31
In this case, a male employee claimed his female supervisor sexually
harassed him, as defined under the ND Human Rights Act, when she
purportedly sent him cards, notes, and e-mails of a sexual nature, discussed
sexual topics at work, bumped into him in the office, and once rubbed his
back.32 While the court found Opp did not have an actionable sexual
harassment claim,33 they did conclude that sexual harassment constituted
sex discrimination under the ND Human Rights Act.34
Sexual harassment theories do act to protect domestic violence victims
who are being harassed or assaulted by the abuser, who are also co-workers
or supervisors at work, but it does not protect the survivor in situations
where abuse is not taking place at work.35 The sexual harassment theory

Glenn George, Theory & Practice: Employer Liability for Sexual Harassment, 13 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 727, 728 (2007).
27. EEOC, supra note 10.
28. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009). The North Dakota Human Rights Act, codified
in Title 14 of the North Dakota Century Code, covers discrimination in the areas of employment,
public accommodations, housing, state and local government services, and credit transactions.
29. The EEOC works with Fair Employment Practice Agencies (FEPAs) to manage charges
of discrimination. The North Dakota Department of Labor was designated as a FEPA in 1987.
See Discrimination in Employment, ND.GOV, http://www nd.gov/labor/humanrights/employ
ment html (last visited Apr. 12, 2013).
30. Opp v. One Source Mgmt., Inc., 1999 ND 52, ¶ 12, 591 N.W.2d 101, 105. The North
Dakota Supreme Court addressed sexual harassment for the first time in this case. Id.
31. Id. ¶ 13, 591 N.W.2d at 106.
32. Id. ¶ 5, 591 N.W.2d at 104.
33. Id. ¶ 16, 591 N.W.2d at 107.
34. Id. ¶ 14, 591 N.W.2d at 106.
35. While further discussion of sexual harassment theories is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is important to note that employers have been found liable under Title VII for cases where a
female employee is harassed by customers of a business and the employer fails to take action to
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does not apply to any of the three factual scenarios in Part III of this Article.
As of this writing, the sexual harassment theory has not been applied in a
factual scenario involving a survivor of domestic violence in North Dakota.
B. DISPARATE TREATMENT
With regard to domestic violence survivors, disparate treatment would
apply only when an employer intentionally treats a survivor of domestic
violence different from other employees. This happens, for example, when
a survivor is fired while her abuser is retained.36 In order for a plaintiff to
succeed under this theory, she must first be able to prove the employer
intended to treat her differently from a male in a similar situation.37 This is
a difficult and high burden to meet, as it falls squarely under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting model.38 Additionally, the disparate treatment
theory is only applicable to a limited number of domestic violence
survivors.39 The two instances in which this theory may apply are: (1)
situations where battered women seek a privilege extended to their male coworkers; or (2) where the same corporation employs both intimate partners
and treats them differently upon learning about their abusive relationship.40
Even if a domestic violence survivor is successful in proving a case for
disparate treatment, the employer has a strong defense in justifying sex
discrimination if they have a “bona fide occupational qualification.”41 This
means if the employer can prove that he or she acted out of necessity to the
business, it is a full defense.42 A common justification used by employers
is the employee would have been fired anyway, and the abuse at work was
simply the “straw that broke the camel’s back.”43

protect them. See, e.g., Lockhard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1072 (10th Cir. 1998)
(employer may be held liable for harassing conduct of its customers).
36. See supra Part III.A.
37. Id.
38. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing the
burden-shifting model used to analyze disparate treatment cases). Under the burden-shifting
model, the complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden of establishing their prima
facie case of discrimination. Id. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for his or her adverse employment action. Id.
39. Calaf, supra note 24, at 182.
40. Id. at 183 (referring to Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 319 (5th Cir.
1981) and RAP, Inc. v. D.C. Comm’n on Rights, 485 A.2d 173, 178 (D.C. 1984)).
41. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(e)(1) (2006).
42. Id.
43. Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Fisher v.
Flynn, 598 F.2d 663, 655 (1st Cir. 1979), Whiteside v. Gill, 580 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1978). In
Rohde, K.O. executives testified that the incident between Linda and her abuser was “the straw
that broke the camel’s back” and “the crowning blow” that caused a termination that was bound to
happen eventually. Rohde, 649 F.2d at 323.
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The disparate treatment theory has been successfully used in litigation.
For example, in Rohde v. K. O. Steel Castings, Inc.,44 Linda Rohde was
successful in her Title VII claim where she experienced an altercation with
her co-worker boyfriend.45 First, Linda was able to prove she was treated
different when she was fired and her abuser was retained.46 Second,
Linda’s employer was unable to meet the burden of proving that Rohde
would have been fired anyway, absent the discrimination as required by the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting model.47 Because of this, the burden
did not shift back to Linda, and the court found her case was strong enough
to undermine her employer’s justification for firing her.48
While North Dakota courts have not addressed a factual scenario
involving disparate treatment of a domestic violence survivor, disparate
treatment sex discrimination in employment has been litigated. Following
federal precedent, North Dakota courts have held disparate treatment sex
discrimination has occurred when: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a
protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; (3)
the plaintiff’s work performance was satisfactory to the employer; and (4)
the plaintiff can show that they were treated adversely because of their
protected status.49 After this prima facie case has been met, the burden
would shift to the employer to prove a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the employment action.50
In order for a survivor of domestic violence to apply the disparate
treatment theory, the survivor must be working with her batterer and
intentionally treated differently than her batterer when an adverse
employment action is taken against her.51 The disparate treatment theory
only reaches one of the three scenarios discussed in Part III of this Article.52
Because the disparate treatment theory has a limited reach for survivors of

44. 649 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1981).
45. Rohde, 649 F.2d at 323.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Miller v. Medcenter One, 1997 ND 231, ¶ 13, 571 N.W.2d 358, 361; see also
Schuhmacher v. North Dakota Hosp. Ass’n, 528 N.W.2d 374, 378 (N.D. 1995) (discussing the
prima facie elements of intentional discrimination); Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503
N.W.2d 225 (N.D. 1993).
50. Schweigert, 503 N.W.2d at 227 (analyzing the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
model under North Dakota law).
51. Miller, ¶ 13, 571 N.W.2d at 361.
52. Referring to situations where the batterer and the survivor work together and the abuse
takes place in the workplace, leading the employer to take action against the female victim and not
the male batterer employee.

2012]

THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY FOR NORTH DAKOTA

997

domestic violence, the disparate treatment impact theory is essential to
ensure fair treatment of women in the workplace, as Title VII mandates.
C. DISPARATE IMPACT
The final theory that should apply to survivors of domestic violence,
and the focus of this paper, is the disparate impact theory. Disparate impact
occurs when an employer has a facially neutral policy or takes an adverse
employment action against a member of a protected class, and that action
impacts the class as a whole.53 Disparate impact does not require a survivor
of domestic violence to prove her employer acted with discriminatory
intent.54 “Instead, she can bring a claim by demonstrating that a specific
employment practice or policy induces a statistically significant disparity
between female and male employees and that a causal relationship exists
between the employment practice in question and the resulting disparity.”55
This theory is essential for domestic violence survivors because it covers
more factual scenarios than sexual harassment or disparate treatment, as
will be shown through factual scenarios laid out in Part III.
As of this writing, there has been no application of the disparate impact
theory to sex discrimination law in North Dakota. This does not mean it
cannot be applied. Hypothetically, if a survivor who lived in North Dakota
was fired because she missed work due to her fear that her abusive partner
would find her there,56 she could apply the disparate impact theory under
the ND Human Rights Act because the ND Human Rights Act prohibits sex
discrimination in employment.57 The survivor would need to prove she is a
member of a protected class, and her employer’s practice of firing her had a
statistically significant impact on her class as a whole. The first element is
met because she is a woman. The second element is proven by: (1) citing
statistics that show domestic violence survivors are disproportionately
women; and (2) that she was fired because of her status as a domestic
violence survivor.58 A full discussion of how this theory can help domestic
violence survivors follows in Part IV.

53. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
54. Calaf, supra note 24, at 176.
55. Id. at 186-87 (citing Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989)
(explaining the requirement that an employment practice caused a statistical disparity)).
56. See Part II.C.
57. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-01 (2009).
58. See infra note 85 (case citing the elements required to prove disparate impact).
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III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE WORKPLACE
If a victim of domestic violence is employed, that violence may affect
her work. It is common for employed domestic violence survivors to be
fired by employers due to “absences, workplace disruptions, performance
problems—or simple prejudice against victims.”59 Between twenty-four
and fifty-two percent of domestic violence victims in three studies reported
they lost a job due, at least in part, to domestic violence.60 A survivor who
is terminated or treated adversely by her employer due to the impact of
domestic violence or sexual assault may have a cause of action under the
disparate impact theory in employment discrimination law.61 These
negative job consequences of domestic violence have a disproportionate
impact on female employees because the vast majority of victims of
domestic violence are women.62 There are three distinct ways that domestic
violence can impact a survivor’s employment: (1) when the batterer and the
survivor work together, the abuse takes place in the workplace, leading the
employer to take action against the female victim and not the male batterer
employee; (2) when the perpetrator of the domestic violence harasses and
stalks the survivor at work, and that negatively impacts her work
performance and causes a perceived safety risk to the workplace, and the
employer fires the female survivor of domestic violence as a result; and (3)
when there is no direct contact by the perpetrator with the employed
survivor’s workplace, but the abuse she is experiencing at home
detrimentally impacts her ability to get to work and maintain her work
performance and she is fired.63 These impacts can manifest in many
different factual scenarios. The following true vignettes demonstrate the
impact domestic violence has on survivors in the workplace.

59. See Deborah A. Widiss, Domestic Violence and the Workplace: The Explosion of State
Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 669, 677 (2008).
60. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 8, at 19.
61. Julie Goldscheid, Disparate Impact’s Impact: The Gender Violence Lens, 90 OR. L.
REV. 33, 34 (2011).
62. CDC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39.
63. See Nicole Buonocore Porter, Victimizing the Abused?: Is Termination the Solution
When Domestic Violence Comes to Work?, 12 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 293-97 (2006)
(describing disparate treatment, disparate impact, and sexual harassment theories and how they
apply to scenarios involving female victims of domestic violence). Being fired is only one
example of an adverse employment action that could result from any of the three listed ways that
domestic violence can impact a survivor’s employment.
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A. WORKING WITH THE ABUSIVE PARTNER
Kim (pseudonym) and her husband worked for the same large
computer company.64 Kim’s husband physically assaulted her both at home
and at work.65 She reported the abuse to a supervisor, obtained a restraining
order against her husband, which included the workplace, and hoped her
employer would enforce it.66 After a few weeks, Kim’s husband assaulted
her at work again, so she called the police and he was arrested.67 Kim
thought her employer would take disciplinary action against her husband,
but after two days nothing was done. Instead, Kim was terminated for
“crying in the lobby,” and her husband was able to retain his job.68
Situations like this are all too common and effectively re-victimize the
survivor.69 In this scenario, the discriminatory act takes place when the
employer becomes “fed up” with the survivor’s “outbursts” at work, and
apparent inability to complete her job-related tasks; the employer takes
action and fires her, while retaining her abuser. This is sex discrimination
as defined under Title VII because the employment action is effectively
treating women differently from men.70 The employer is victimizing the
survivor by firing her, and allowing her abuser, the cause of her outbursts
and inability to function in the workplace, to remain employed.
B. WHEN THE ABUSIVE PARTNER IS NOT A CO-WORKER
In many cases a survivor of domestic violence does not work with her
abuser, but the effects of the violence she is facing at home carry into the
workplace. Cindy (pseudonym) lives with her boyfriend, and one night at
home he rapes her.71 Cindy finds she is experiencing trauma-related
anxiety attacks and begins seeing a rape counselor.72 Her rapist begins to
stalk her at work through harassing phone calls; he is angry because she

64. Id. at 276 (citing ROBIN R. RUNGE & MARCELLENE E. HEARN, EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS
ADVOCACY FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT 17-18, 26-29
(Dec/Jan 2000)).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Porter, supra note 63, at 280.
70. See, e.g., Rohde v. K.O. Steel Castings, Inc., 649 F.2d 317, 323 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
female employee established a prima facie case for employment discrimination under Title VII
when she was terminated after an altercation with a male coworker with whom she had a
relationship, while the male coworker was retained).
71. Robin R. Runge, Employment Rights of Sexual Assault Victims, 40 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 299, 299 (2006).
72. Id.
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reported the rape and agreed to assist in the prosecution.73 She does not
want to tell her employer about what happened because she is embarrassed,
but her anxiety attacks and his phone calls are causing her to breakdown at
work, affecting her ability to do her job.74 More than anything, Cindy
probably wanted to remain safe at work and keep her job.75 Instead, if she
tells her employer that she is a domestic violence survivor, she may have
her hours cut back, be overlooked for promotions, or even terminated.76
C. INDIRECT IMPACT ON THE SURVIVOR’S EMPLOYMENT
Mary (pseudonym) had a job as a counselor for people living with
autism and she loved it.77 She did not work with her partner. She was
unhappy in her relationship, and when she attempted to end it, her partner
beat her so badly she was hospitalized.78
A year after the breakup, Mary’s ex-partner repeatedly threatened to
kill her, harassed her, and stalked her while she pursued prosecution for the
assault. Terrified, she obtained a civil protection order against her expartner and had it renewed several times. As a result of this continual
harassment, Mary often had difficulty sleeping at night, anxiety-ridden and
fearful of how her ex-partner might harm her.79
Throughout the process of obtaining judicial restraining orders and
attending domestic violence counseling sessions, Mary missed four days of
work.80 One weekend, Mary’s ex-partner showed up at her home with a
gun and threatened to kill her. Mary fled to a friend’s house in another city,
and on Monday, when she was leaving her friend’s house to go to work, she
saw her ex-partner waiting for her outside.81 Afraid of another attack, Mary
called the police and missed work that day.82 “Her employer fired her two
days later, citing her poor attendance record.”83 Mary’s story depicts the
manifestation of domestic violence in the workplace only through the
survivor herself, as the abuser had no direct contact with the workplace.

73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id.
77. Robin R. Runge, Double Jeopardy: Victims of Domestic Violence Face Twice the Abuse,
25 HUM. RTS. 19, 19 (1998).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.

2012]

THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY FOR NORTH DAKOTA

1001

IV. USING THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY TO PROTECT
WORKING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SURVIVORS
Facially neutral employment policies or actions can have a “disparate
impact” on an employee that is a member of a class protected by Title VII.84
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,85 the United States Supreme Court provided
guidance on how a plaintiff is to prove discrimination under the disparate
impact theory. In Griggs, a class of African-American employees brought
suit against their employer because they were required to have obtained a
high school education or pass a standardized general intelligence test as a
condition of employment or to transfer jobs, where neither related to job
performance. In cases like this where disparate impact is alleged, the
plaintiff employees need to prove: (1) they are a member of a protected
class under Title VII; and (2) the employer’s neutral policy or practice has
an adverse impact on the class as a whole.86 Statistical evidence is often
required to prove the second part of a disparate impact claim.87 For
example, in Griggs, the employees proved the employer’s policy of
requiring a high school diploma for higher paid jobs had an adverse impact
on African-Americans because they were disproportionately less educated
than white employees, due to long-standing inferior educations received in
segregated schools.88 Similarly, using existing statistical evidence that
shows domestic violence survivors are primarily women can be used to
support the disparate impact theory in employment discrimination.
Being terminated for missing work to heal from injuries inflicted by an
abuser is one example of how a survivor of abuse may lose her job due to
domestic violence. At first glance, this action may seem like an employer is
simply exercising the legal right to terminate an at-will employee.
However, it can be persuasively argued that an employer is discriminating
against the female employee when the employer systemically fires the
employee because of her status as a survivor. In general, it is legal for an
employer to fire an at-will employee who is a woman, for missing too much
work or for poor job performance. However, the employer violates Title
VII when the employer takes adverse action, (i.e., termination), against a
woman because of her status as a survivor of domestic violence.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
401 U.S. 424 (1971).
See, e.g., id. at 429-30.
Id. at 430.
Id.

1002

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 88:989

The disparate impact theory is less frequently used in employment
discrimination law than some suggest it should be.89 Critics state the theory
was a mistake in the first place and ask why changes need to be made at
all.90 For example, Michael Selmi, a harsh critic of the disparate impact
theory, asserts it is more difficult to prove than intentional discrimination,
because the business necessity part of the test is difficult to satisfy.91
Without being able to prove your employer’s action is not necessary for his
or her business, the court’s decision on this is entirely subjective, leaving
the court able to make “normative judgments regarding the merits of the
challenged practice.”92 While it is true that courts may be reluctant to
classify an action as discriminatory, I would argue it is even less likely for
courts to find intentional discrimination. By creating a place in the
regulations to explain the discriminatory effect that unintentional acts are
having, employers may have the opportunity to correct behavior that has
been hurting a protected class of people. The fact that employers have an
easy time satisfying the burden of proving a business necessity should not
preclude a plaintiff from challenging a discriminatory practice.
As with the discriminatory effect standard proposed under the FHA,
Title VII could easily outline the required business necessity burden. I
agree with Selmi when he states, absent a “smoking gun” convincing courts
that discrimination exists may be difficult for the plaintiff, let alone trying
to draw an inference from a seemingly neutral act.93 However, I disagree
with Selmi that this is reason enough to give up on disparate impact,
classify it as a mistake, and try to expand the definition of intent instead.94
Expanding the definition of intentional discrimination will not protect
domestic violence survivors in the workplace because it will not address the
impact that unintentional discrimination has on these women. Because the
vast majority of domestic violence survivors are women, discriminating
against a domestic violence survivor is sex discrimination.95 Most
employers are not likely intentionally discriminating against women, but
the end result is the same. I would argue the best way to protect these
women is to clarify and strengthen the discriminatory effects standard for
finding sex discrimination under Title VII.
89. Id.; Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace Mirage, 47
WM. & MARY L. Rev. 911, 985-88 (2005) (arguing for the revival of the disparate impact theory).
90. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701,
753-55 (2006).
91. Id. at 706, 769.
92. Id. at 769.
93. Id. at 768.
94. Id.
95. CDC SURVEY, supra note 1, at 39.
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Domestic violence is a nationwide problem.96 If this nation wants to
move toward ending violence against women, the discriminatory acts that
victimize survivors of domestic violence need to stop. Wrongfully
terminating a woman, who is a survivor of domestic violence, could prevent
her from fleeing her abuser, the very thing that society is constantly
criticizing her for not doing.97
V. CHANGES IN TITLE VII INTERPRETATION
Title VII’s federal regulations do not properly describe how the
disparate impact theory can be used to shield the protected classes from
unintentional discrimination in the workplace. In order to increase
protections for survivors of domestic violence, I propose two changes.
First, the regulations need to not only mention, but also describe, the
disparate impact theory and how it can be used to protect survivors of
domestic violence from workplace discrimination. Second, cases in which
a domestic violence survivor does not work with her abuser, but is fired or
otherwise adversely treated for reasons that are attributable to the abuse,
should be added as examples in the federal regulations. It would be
extremely influential for the EEOC to consider proposing a rule that would
add the discriminatory effects standard or disparate impact theory to the
regulations as well. Specifically, it would make the most difference to
domestic violence survivors and women as a class if guidelines were added
to the sex discrimination section.
Changes in the interpretation of Title VII would allow lawyers to
understand how discrimination against domestic violence survivors can be
argued under the disparate impact theory. Clearer guidelines or regulations
would also allow domestic violence survivors to file charges of
discrimination with the EEOC (or at the local level, with the North Dakota
Department of Labor) without the assistance of an attorney—a cost that
many cannot afford. As Selmi pointed out, it was the EEOC, and not the
courts, that originally came up with the disparate impact theory as an
alternative approach to cases of employment discrimination.98
While it is true today that a woman in this situation could bring a
charge of sex discrimination to the EEOC, without clarification in the
regulations it would be unlikely for a favorable result to be achieved. One
96. Id.
97. See Robin H. Thompson, Domestic Violence and Its Effects on the Workplace, in AM.
BAR ASS’N, THE IMPACT OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ON YOUR LEGAL PRACTICE 364, 367 (2d ed.
2004) (stating that maintaining steady employment is central to a victim’s security and ability to
be independent from an abuser).
98. Selmi, supra note 90, at 715.
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factor that may deter women from filing claims of sex discrimination is a
lack of understanding of the law.99 The same holds true for attorneys who
represent these women. This is not only because it is rarely used but also
because it is undeveloped in case law. Changing the regulations could also
increase private rights of action on behalf of domestic violence victims who
are discriminated against. “By making explicit the ways in which domestic
and sexual violence continue to be a site of sex discrimination, employment
law can more effectively address impermissible discrimination, promote
retention of valued employees, and help domestic and sexual violence
survivors attain safety and economic security.”100 One of the best ways to
make this explicit is through significant changes in the federal regulations
interpreting sex discrimination under Title VII.
VI. APPLICATION OF TITLE VII TO FEMALE EMPLOYEES WHO
ARE SURVIVORS OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Employment discrimination against survivors of domestic violence is
not being addressed by the only applicable theory: disparate impact.
Women, like Mary or Cindy, are terminated for reasons that are completely
the fault of their abusive partner. Title VII states employers cannot
discriminate against someone on the basis of sex.101 Due to the proportion
of women who are domestic violence survivors, when an employer fires her
for missing work, for medical treatment, to attend court, or other domestic
violence related issues, the employer is effectively firing her for being a
victim.102 Disparate impact is the most applicable theory to seek recourse
against the employer’s discriminatory acts but as it stands it is not being
used. The problem is that advocates, lawyers, and administrative agents
either do not know how to apply the theory, or they do not know it is the
appropriate legal tool in the first place—there needs to be more guidance
regarding the disparate impact theory as an appropriate doctrine for
addressing discrimination and regulations to clarify how to apply the
disparate impact theory.

99. Julie Goldscheid, Gender Violence and Work: Reckoning with the Boundaries of Sex
Discrimination Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 61, 84 (2008).
100. Id. at 123.
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2006).
102. Mary’s situation is one where there is no direct contact by the perpetrator with the
employed survivor’s workplace, but the abuse she is experiencing at home detrimentally impacts
her ability to attend work and maintain her work performance and she is fired.
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A. DISPARATE IMPACT’S LACK OF INFLUENCE
Despite the fact that the disparate impact theory would cover a breadth
of discriminatory situations in the workplace, very few survivors use the
doctrine in court or file charges of sex discrimination with the EEOC.103
Women who do not work with their batterers, who are not harassed by their
abusers in the workplace, or who do not work for an organization that
practices overt discrimination against battered women, can only sue under
the disparate impact theory.104
The low number of employment
discrimination claims filed by domestic violence survivors may be
attributable to factors such as a victim’s reluctance to self-identify, lack of
understanding of employment rights, and her lawyer’s failure to recognize a
domestic violence victim may have suffered employment discrimination
based on her sex in the first place.105 In addition to these barriers, the
evidentiary requirements for the disparate impact theory are still difficult to
meet, even though proof of discriminatory intent is not required.106 “Even
in the context of domestic violence, a plaintiff would still have to rely on
statistics to demonstrate that . . . a facially neutral practice of terminating
any employee injured in a domestic violence incident impacts more women
than men.”107 These statistics are relatively easy to find but may be a
reason why the theory is underused. The above reasons also expose a crack
in existing employment discrimination law where survivors of domestic
violence may fall through.
The disparate impact theory has the capacity to reach and protect many
domestic violence survivors because it protects against common situations
of implicit discrimination. These situations include, but are not limited to,
Mary’s situation, where she experiences domestic violence at work through
the affects it has on her daily life and not because she is being assaulted at
work. When a facially neutral policy, such as firing a domestic violence
survivor because of her status as a survivor, is upheld, so is discrimination
against women.
B. LIMITATIONS OF TITLE VII
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to include “disparate impact” for
the first time.108 The statute states an unlawful employment practice based
103. Calaf, supra note 24, at 186.
104. Id.
105. Goldscheid, supra note 99, at 84.
106. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).
107. Calaf, supra note 24, at 187.
108. See Civil Rights Acts of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991)
(current version at 42 U.S.C. § 20003-2(k)(1)A) (2006)).
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on disparate impact is established under this title in two circumstances.109
First, the complaining party needs to demonstrate that the respondent used a
particular employment practice that caused a disparate impact on the basis
of their membership in a protected class.110 Alternatively, the complaining
party could make a successful disparate impact claim by identifying an
adequate, alternative employment practice and the employer refusing to
adopt such a practice.111 Title VII itself is not the problem; rather, the
interpretation of the disparate impact theory within Title VII is lacking.
As previously mentioned, there are no North Dakota examples of the
disparate impact theory being used in sex discrimination under the ND
Human Rights Act, let alone one where it was applied to a situation in
which a survivor of domestic violence was discriminated against. Critics
may argue this absence of case law is proof the theory is not needed;
however, it is more likely because lawyers do not know how to identify and
apply the disparate impact theory for their clients in the first place. Again,
this does not mean that the ND Human Rights Act is the problem. Rather,
the problem lies in the interpretation of the Act.
With regard to the disparate impact theory, simply looking to the
statutory text of Title VII will not always give you a clear answer.112 “The
relevant analysis of Title VII’s disparate impact provisions would
accordingly focus on the statutory language that creates liability for
disparate impact . . . . [L]iability for disparate impact in employment
practices was engineered by the EEOC and the courts before it was ever
clearly approved by Congress.”113 Title VII does not instruct how courts
should apply the theory in sex discrimination. In 2010, the United States
Supreme Court decided Lewis v. City of Chicago,114 holding it was not the
court’s job to assess various legal approaches and choose the best one.115 In
his opinion, Justice Scalia stated:
Our charge is to give effect to the law Congress enacted. By
enacting § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i), Congress allowed claims to be

109. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
110. Id. Protected classes include race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. The
respondent must also fail to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity. Id. (emphasis added).
111. Id.
112. Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact: Round Three, 117 HARV.
L. REV. 493, 506 (2003).
113. Id.
114. 130 S. Ct. 2191 (2010).
115. Lewis, 130 S. Ct. at 2200. Lewis alleged the City’s practice of selecting only applicants
who scored an eighty-nine or above on a written test for firefighters had a disparate impact on
African American employees. Id.
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brought against an employer who uses a practice that causes
disparate impact, whatever the employer’s motives and whether or
not he has employed the same practice in the past. If that effect
was unintended, it is a problem for Congress, not one that federal
courts can fix.116
The EEOC guidelines interpret the theories posed in Title VII that may
be used in employment discrimination. Although not binding, courts often
look to the administrative agencies charged with enforcing the laws for
direction. The problem is if you look up “sex discrimination” in Chapter
XIV of Title 29 of the regulations you will not see disparate impact or
disparate treatment described there.117 As a matter of fact, the only theory
of sex discrimination fully described in this section is sexual harassment.118
Sexual harassment is only one of three ways a domestic violence survivor
may bring an action of sex discrimination against her employer;119
therefore, the regulations seem to fall short. In fact, the regulations
contained in Part 1604 describing sex discrimination do not describe
disparate treatment or impact theories. I propose that Part 1604 of the
regulations should outline how each of these theories may be used in sex
discrimination cases, and offer examples of each.120 Discrimination against
domestic violence survivors in the workplace could be a featured example
used to explain how survivors are being discriminated against and how it is
in fact sex discrimination. It follows that if these proposals were
implemented at the federal level, North Dakota courts could look to them
for guidance as well.121
C. DISPARATE IMPACT IN HOUSING LAW: A COMPARISON
Successful arguments under the disparate impact theory have been
made in a housing context where domestic violence survivors find
themselves adversely treated by landlords.122 For example, one domestic
116. Id.
117. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600-1691 (2012).
118. Id. § 1604.
119. Calaf, supra note 24, at 177.
120. The EEOC fact sheet published on their website is a great place to start for examples of
disparate treatment against domestic violence survivors that are recognized by the EEOC as forms
of sex discrimination. EEOC, supra note 10.
121. See Schweigert v. Provident Life Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 255, 257 (N.D. 1993) (stating
that the North Dakota Supreme Court looks to federal interpretations of Title VII where state case
law is lacking).
122. See, e.g., Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, Deputy Assistant Sec’y for Enforcement
and Programs of U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and Urban Dev. to the Directors of the Office of Fair Hous.
and Equal Opportunity (Feb. 9, 2011) (discussing Alvera v. Creekside Vill. Apts., No. 10-990538-8; see also Bouley v. Young-Sabourin, 394 F. Supp. 2d 675, 675 (D. Vt. 2005). See
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violence survivor brought a claim under the Fair Housing Act (FHA)
challenging her eviction under her landlord’s zero-violence policy using the
disparate impact theory.123 An unlawful termination in the employment law
context may be considered analogous to an unlawful eviction in housing.124
For example, Tiffani Alvera favorably settled her case when her landlord
wrongfully evicted her after obtaining a protection order against her abusive
husband.125 For Tiffani, this was a discriminatory event that had a disparate
impact on her sex.126 The same approach should apply in discriminatory
decisions made in employment discrimination cases.
The United States Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD)127 recently proposed regulations interpreting the FHA that would
improve use of the disparate impact theory in housing law.128 The rule
known as, “Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory
Effects Standard” proposed on November 16, 2011, would establish
uniform standards in determining discriminatory acts under the FHA.129
Under this rule, liability is determined by a burden-shifting approach.
The plaintiff or complainant must first bear the burden of proving its prima
facie case of either disparate impact or perpetuation of segregation, after
which the burden shifts to the defendant or respondent to prove that the
challenged practice has a necessary and manifest relationship to one or
more of the defendant’s or respondent’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory
interests.130
The interpretation of the FHA and Title VII are frequently compared to
each other in the courts131 and the same burden-shifting approach is
mentioned in the statutory text of Title VII.132 “HUD’s proposal is
generally Lenora M. Lapidus, Doubly Victimized: Housing Discrimination Against Victims of
Domestic Violence, 11 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 377 (2003).
123. See Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 122, at 10.
124. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 22-34, Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010).
125. Memorandum from Sara K. Pratt, supra note 122, at 121.
126. Id.
127. HUD is the federal agency charged with enforcement of Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act.
128. At the time of this writing, the proposed rule was not in effect. As of February 15,
2013, the Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard became a
final rule and took effect on March 18, 2013. 78 F.R. 11459, 24 C.F.R. 100, available at
https://federalregister.gov/a/2013-03375 (last accessed April 26, 2013).
129. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed.
Reg. 70,921 (proposed Nov. 16 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100).
130. Id. at 70, 923-24.
131. See, e.g., Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935-41
(2d Cir. 1988) (using Title VII precedent to analyze disparate treatment in a FHA case); id. at 935
(citing cases that have noted the persuasive parallel between Title VII and Title VIII).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A) (2006).
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consistent with the discriminatory effects standard confirmed by Congress
in the 1991 amendments to Title VII.”133 The United States Supreme Court
held Title VII reaches employment practices that have a discriminatory
effect in cases such as Griggs,134 yet the regulations interpreting Title VII
are not as clear as those proposed to further interpret discriminatory effects
under the FHA. The Court in Griggs also asserted “[t]he objective of
Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the
statute. It was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white
employees over other employees.”135 Griggs was a monumental case in
employment discrimination law because it established use of the disparate
impact theory.
The intended place for the proposed rule in Title 24 of the regulations
is Part 100, “Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act.”136 The
function of this section is to describe prohibited conduct under the FHA.137
It also serves as a guide, not unlike the function of Chapter XIV of Title 29
as it relates to prohibited practices under Title VII.138 The proposed rule
would add a subpart to 24 C.F.R. 100 that describes how liability might be
established under the FHA using a discriminatory effect standard.139 This
standard is essentially another way of describing the disparate impact
theory. The new section not only defines the standard, but it goes on to
describe the necessary burdens that a complainant would have to meet.140
In relevant part, the new section, 100.500 describes the discriminatory
effect standard as follows:
Liability may be established under this subpart based on a housing
practice’s discriminatory effect, as defined in § 100.500(a), even if
the housing practice is not motivated by a prohibited intent. The
housing practice may still be lawful if supported by a legally
sufficient justification, as defined in § 100.500(b). The burdens of
proof for establishing a violation under this subpart are set forth in
§ 100.500(c).141

133. See id. § 2000-e-2(k).
134. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971).
135. Id. at 429-30.
136. 24 C.F.R. pt. 100.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 3601.
138. 29 C.F.R. ch. XIV.
139. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed.
Reg. 70,865, 70,926 (Nov. 16, 2011) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100), see also supra note 128.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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Furthermore, the rule defines discriminatory effect as a housing
practice that:
[A]ctually or predictably: (1) [R]esults in a disparate impact on a
group of persons on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
handicap, familial status, or national origin; or (2) [H]as the effect
of creating, perpetuating, or increasing segregated housing patterns
on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status,
or national origin.142
The above description and definition of this theory will make a
significant difference in assisting domestic violence survivors in bringing
housing discrimination claims.143 I would anticipate the same important
difference could be made in the employment law arena if the EEOC were to
propose a similar rule amending the guidelines on sex discrimination.
Critics of the discriminatory effect standard may argue the theory poses
too much of a burden on landlords and will open the floodgates for
discrimination claims against companies who are trying to maintain their
businesses. However, the proposed rule accounts for businesses that have a
justifiable reason for the conduct in question. As in Title VII cases, in
claims of housing discrimination the burden shifts from the complainant or
plaintiff to the respondent or defendant to prove they have a “legitimate,
nondiscriminatory” interest in supporting the challenged practice.144 This
means the landlord, or apartment management company, has a business
necessity defense which may be used to prove the action was legitimate.
Employers would also have a chance to prove the adverse employment
action taken has a legitimate, nondiscriminatory purpose in maintaining the
business.
VII. IMPLEMENTING CHANGES AND STRENGTHENING
DISPARATE IMPACT
The federal regulations do not sufficiently describe the disparate
impact theory and how it can be used to shield the protected classes from
unintentional discrimination in the workplace. I have proposed changes
that would clarify the interpretation of Title VII in a way that uses it as
Congress intended: to protect against sex discrimination and thus protect
survivors of domestic violence in the workplace as well. First, the
142. Id.
143. See generally Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 22-34, Magner v. Gallagher, 619 F.3d 823 (8th Cir. 2010).
144. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard, 76 Fed.
Reg. at 70,924.
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regulations interpreting Title VII need to not only mention, but also
describe the disparate impact theory in a way similar to the rule proposed
by HUD in interpreting the FHA. This would clarify the standard for
determining an employment act that has a discriminatory effect. Housing
and employment law have often been compared in discrimination cases,145
and I see no reason why the standards used to interpret disparate impact
under the FHA cannot be transferrable to Title VII. Second, cases in which
a domestic violence survivor does not work with her abuser, but is fired or
otherwise adversely treated for reasons that are attributable to the abuse,
should be added as examples in the regulations.
The only theory of sex discrimination under Title VII currently
described in the regulations that could be used to protect a survivor of
domestic violence is sexual harassment, a narrow theory applicable only to
instances where the survivor’s violent partner is a co-worker abusing her at
the workplace.146 Employment decisions that have a disparate impact on
domestic violence survivors also have a disparate impact on women as a
class due to domestic violence predominantly impacting women. 147 Claims
brought under this theory should be analyzed as affecting women as a
whole class, rather than a single survivor in her workplace.148 Analyzing
claims this way would bring to light the importance of the disparate impact
theory by showing the larger impact it can have on protecting women. In
order to achieve this goal, it would be beneficial to first add the disparate
impact theory as an example of sex-based discrimination after section
1604.11 on sexual harassment. The section could be added as 1604.12 and
be titled “discriminatory effect prohibited” or “proving sex discrimination
under the disparate impact theory” and describe how a plaintiff may make a
claim of discrimination under this standard. Ideally, this new section would
also include subsections of examples of workplace discrimination against
domestic violence survivors.
HUD has already done much of the work in their recent proposal for
the FHA regulations that the EEOC would have to do in order to propose an
additional rule in their Title VII regulations. I anticipate that a proposal to
expand the regulations for discrimination based on sex found in part 1604
would look very similar to those proposed as “Subpart G” for the FHA

145. See generally Huntington Branch, N.A.A.C.P. v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926,
935 (2d Cir. 1988).
146. See supra text accompanying note 35.
147. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 62.
148. See id. (describing the importance of analyzing “single decision” cases under the
disparate impact theory; this analysis is important but beyond the scope of this writing).
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regulations.149 Specific examples of prohibited acts of discrimination to be
analyzed under the disparate impact theory or “discriminatory effects
standard” as it is described in HUD’s proposed rule should be added to the
Title VII regulations.150 This could be incorporated through describing a
scenario where an employment action taken against a domestic violence
survivor would lead to a disparate impact on women as a class. For
example, if a domestic violence survivor is terminated after disclosing to
her employer she is a survivor of violence and needs a day off to obtain a
protection order, and she is subsequently fired for this request or for the
employer’s stated fear of her bringing violence into the workplace, that
would be a scenario that represents unlawful discrimination under Title VII
using the disparate impact theory. Essentially, these cases would include
instances where a domestic violence survivor is terminated for a reason that
is attributable to her status as a survivor and not to particular employment
policies that would naturally be subject to disparate impact review.151
VIII. CONCLUSION
In order to move toward ending violence against women, the
discriminatory acts that doubly victimize survivors of domestic violence
need to stop. By wrongfully terminating a woman who is a domestic
violence survivor, employers could be precluding her from fleeing her
abuser. The disparate impact theory is important in the protection of
survivors and should not only be maintained, but also strengthened.
Interpretation of Title VII should be clarified to include a breakdown of the
disparate impact theory and explanation of the class-wide discrimination
caused by discriminating against a survivor of domestic violence. Adding
the disparate impact theory to the guidelines on discrimination based on sex
in the Code of Federal Regulations would ultimately work toward ending
violence against women at both state and national levels, through protecting
survivors from acts of discrimination in the workplace.

149. As of this writing, the FHA regulations I have mentioned have not yet been enacted.
150. See generally Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects
Standard, 76 Fed. Reg. at 70,921.
151. GOLDSCHIED & RUNGE, supra note 4, at 48.

